Vulnerability in nokogiri
In Nokogiri versions <= 1.11.0.rc3, XML Schemas parsed by
are trusted by default, allowing external resources to be accessed over the
network, potentially enabling XXE or SSRF attacks.
This behavior is counter to the security policy followed by Nokogiri maintainers, which is to treat all input as untrusted by default whenever possible.
Please note that this security fix was pushed into a new minor version, 1.11.x, rather than a patch release to the 1.10.x branch, because it is a breaking change for some schemas and the risk was assessed to be “Low Severity”.
<= 1.10.10 as well as prereleases
There are no known workarounds for affected versions. Upgrade to Nokogiri
1.11.0.rc4 or later.
If, after upgrading to
1.11.0.rc4 or later, you wish
to re-enable network access for resolution of external resources (i.e., return to
the previous behavior):
Nokogiri::XML::Schemaconstructor, pass as the second parameter an instance of
NONETflag turned off.
So if your previous code was:
# in v1.11.0.rc3 and earlier, this call allows resources to be accessed over the network # but in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, this call will disallow network access for external resources schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(schema) # in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, the following is equivalent to the code above # (the second parameter is optional, and this demonstrates its default value) schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(schema, Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions::DEFAULT_SCHEMA)
Then you can add the second parameter to indicate that the input is trusted by changing it to:
# in v1.11.0.rc3 and earlier, this would raise an ArgumentError # but in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, this allows resources to be accessed over the network schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(trusted_schema, Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions.new.nononet)
|Access Vector||Access Complexity||Authentication||Confidentiality Impact||Integrity Impact||Availability Impact|